Chapter 2 foreword

In presenting a theory of justice I have tried to bring together the ideas from the papers I have written over the past dozen years into one coherent view.All the issues discussed in these papers are raised again, and generally in greater detail.Other issues are also discussed in order to round out the theory.The exposition of this theory is divided into three parts.Part I deals with the areas discussed in Justice Is Fairness (1958) and Distributive Justice: An Addendum (1963), while the three chapters of Part II deal with the Constitutional Liberties accordingly (1963), Distributive Justice (1967), and Nonviolent Resistance (1966), with several additions.The second chapter of the final part deals with issues of The Sense of Justice (1963).Except in a few places, the other chapters of this part do not correspond to published papers.Although the main idea is basically the same, I have tried to eliminate inconsistencies in the arguments and to flesh out and strengthen many of the arguments.

The following is perhaps my best statement of the purpose of this book.In a large part of modern moral philosophy, the dominant systems theory has been some form of utilitarianism.One reason is that it has been embraced by a whole host of talented writers who have built a body of thought that is truly impressive in its breadth and depth.We sometimes forget that the great utilitarians Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, and Mill were social theorists and economists of the first rank, and that their moral doctrines were tailored to meet the needs of their broad interests and to fit a proposed by a comprehensive arrangement.Their critics have often attacked them on a much narrower front, pointing out the difficulty of the principle of utility and referring to the contradictions between its implications and our moral sensibilities.But I don't think they were able to create a practical and systematic morality against the principle of utility.As a result, we often seem to have to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism.Our final foothold is likely to be a disguised utilitarian principle, although this principle has been limited in some specific aspects due to the constraints of intuitionism.This view is not unreasonable; nor can we be sure that a more reasonable view can be advanced.But that's not a reason not to give it a try.

What I have been trying to do is to summarize the traditional contract theory represented by Locke, Lu Jun and Kant, and raise it to a higher level of abstraction.I do this because I want the theory to improve.Thereby no longer leaving the fatal flaw that is generally considered to be more obvious.Moreover, the theory seems to offer another systematic account of justice, one superior to the traditional dominant utilitarianism, or so I think.The resulting theory is largely of the character of Kant's philosophy.Admittedly, I must admit that there is nothing original in the points I have advanced.The main ideas are ancient and well known.My intention is to organize these ideas into a general system by some simplification, so that their full significance can be grasped.If this book can bring into clearer view the main structural features of another conception of justice contained in the contract tradition, and point out the way to study it in depth, then my purpose in writing this book will be fully realized. .I think that of all the traditional views, this conception of justice comes closest to our considered judgments of justice, and constitutes the most suitable moral basis for a democratic society.

This is a huge book, not only because of its size.Therefore, to make it easier for the reader to understand, here are a few words as a guide.Sections 1-4 of Chapter 1 introduce basic intuitive concepts about the theory of justice, from which we can directly discuss the two principles of justice applicable to institutions in Sections 11-17 of Chapter 2, and then discuss them in full in Chapter 3. The chapter describes the original state.If the concept of prioritization is unfamiliar, a glance at Section 8 may prove necessary.Second, sections of Chapter IV, such as Sections 33-35 on equal liberty, and Sections 39-40 on the meaning of the priority of liberty and Kant's interpretation, describe the theory most fully.These take up about a third of the book so far and cover most of the main points of the theory.

A theory of justice, however, runs the risk of being misunderstood if the arguments of the last Part are not considered.Particular emphasis should be placed on the following sections, namely Chapter VII, Sections 66-67, on Moral Values ​​and Self-Respect and Related Concepts; Chapter VIII, Section 77, on the Foundations of Equality; Section 79, Section 82 on the Priority of Liberty, and Sections 85-88 on the Unity and Consistency of the Self, all in Chapter IX.These few verses, together with other verses, are still nowhere near half the book. The title of each section, the preface of each chapter and the index of the whole book will provide convenience for readers to understand the content of this book.This point seems self-evident, but I will say that I have avoided extensive discussion of methodological issues.General considerations are given of the nature of moral theory in Section 9 and the justification issues of Sections 4 and 87.There are also a few digressions in verse 62 about the meaning of "good."There are occasional methodological observations and a few digressions, but for the most part I have attempted to present a genuine theory of justice.Comparisons and contrasts with other theories, and occasional criticisms of them, especially utilitarianism, are seen as means to this end.

I have left out most of Chapters 4 through 8 in the more basic parts of the book, but that doesn't mean I'm implying that these chapters are unimportant.Or just think of them as application problems.Instead, I would argue that a major test of a theory of justice is the extent to which it codifies and systematizes our considered judgments on a wide range of issues.Therefore, it is necessary to raise the topics of these chapters for discussion, and the conclusions drawn from them in turn revise the original views.But in this respect, the reader has more freedom to choose and choose, and he can focus on the issues he cares about most.

In writing this book, I have had the help of many other people besides those mentioned in the book.I would like to express my gratitude here to some of them.Three different manuscripts were circulated among my students and colleagues, from whom I benefited greatly from numerous suggestions and criticisms.I thank Alan Gibbard for his criticism of my first draft (1964-1965).He disagreed with the reference to the veil of ignorance at the time, and it seemed necessary to include some theory of the good in order to take his opinion into consideration.The result is the notion of a basic good, building on the concepts discussed in Chapter 7.I would also like to thank him and Norman Daniels for pointing out my difficulty in presenting utilitarianism as the basis of personal responsibility and obligation.Their objections have led me to cut out most of the topic and to simplify this part of the theory.David Diamond strongly disagrees with my account of equality, and in particular that I do not consider the relevance of status in my discussion.In an effort to address this and other issues, including society as social association within social association and the priority of liberty, I ended up including self-esteem as a fundamental good in the book.I had a useful discussion with David Richards on the issue of political responsibility and obligation.Although the issue of work outside of duty is not the central theme of this book, I have also been assisted in developing this issue by Barry Curtis and John Troyer; nonetheless, they may still disagree with me .I should also thank Michael Gardner and Jane English for enabling me to make several revisions in the final text.

Several people discussed the published papers, and I was fortunate to have valuable critical comments from them.I am indebted to Brian Barry, Michael Lesnov, and R. P. Wolf for their discussion of the formulation and argumentation of the two principles of justice.Wherever I did not accept their conclusions; I was also obliged to develop the argument further in light of their opinions.I hope that the theory now proposed will no longer be censured by them, nor will it be so vigorously opposed by John Chapman.The relation between the two principles of justice and what I have called the general conception of justice is similar to that proposed by S. I. Ben.To him, and to Lawrence.Stern and Scott Boorman are grateful for their advice in this regard.Norman Carr's criticism of the ideas of moral theory contained in these essays seems to me to be largely correct, and I have therefore endeavored to elevate this theory of justice against his criticism.In doing so, I was taught by Burton Draper, for he illustrated to me W. V. Quinn's views and convinced me that the concepts of meaning and analysis were not as That plays a crucial role in moral theory.Their relevance to other philosophical problems is indisputable in every respect; but I have tried to free the theory of justice from their limitations.I have, therefore, followed, with some modifications, the views expressed in my essay "A Brief Introduction to Ethics."I would also like to express my gratitude to A. K. Sen for his thought-provoking discussions and critiques of justice theory.These discussions and critiques have allowed me to improve my formulation of the problem in many places.His book will prove indispensable to philosophers wishing to study what economists consider a more formal theory of social choice.At the same time, philosophical issues are carefully discussed.

Many people have automatically written review articles on these several different manuscripts.Gilbert Hallman's comments on the original draft were so important that I had to abandon several points and make fundamental changes in several places.While I was at the Boulder Institute for Philosophy (summer 1966), I also had comments from Leonard Creamerman, Richard Lee, and Huntington Terrell ; later it was Terrell's again.I have endeavored to condition my views on these comments, which also included very broad and helpful comments from Charles Fried, Robert Nozick, and J. N. Hickler, each of whom gave a great deal throughout. s help.In formulating my views on the good, I have benefited greatly from years of discussions with J. M. Cooper, T. M. Scanon, and A. T. Timoczko, as well as with Thomas Nagel.I would also like to thank Nagel for helping me figure out how theories of justice relate to utilitarianism.I must also thank R.B. Brant and Joshua Rabinowitz for their many helpful insights into the revision of the second draft, and B.J. Diggs, J.C. Hassanyi and W. G. Runciman's illuminating letter.

During the writing of the third draft (1969-1970), Brant, Tracey Kendler, E. S. Phelps, and Emily Rorty continued to provide suggestions, and their critical comments were useful. Very helpful.In this draft, I received many valuable comments and revision suggestions from Herbert Morris, Lesnov, and Nozick; these comments and suggestions helped me avoid many mistakes and greatly improved the quality of this book .I especially want to thank Nozick for his practical help and encouragement in the final stages.Unfortunately, I have not been able to deal with all the criticisms I have received, and I am fully aware of the various shortcomings that remain; The reasons for the deficiencies that still exist in the book are irrelevant.

The Center for Advanced Study at Stanford University has provided me with the ideal place to do my work.I would like to express my deep gratitude for its support in 1969-1970 and to the Guggenheim and Kendall Foundations in 1964-1965.I would like to thank Anna Toll and Margaret Griffin for their help with the final draft. I would never have been able to finish this book without the kindness of these good people. john rolls Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971