Chapter 28 4. Revealing the Eight Historical Mysteries of the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area

In April 1928, the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong and some Nanchang Uprising troops led by Zhu De and Chen Yi successfully joined forces in Jinggangshan.Jinggangshan became the first revolutionary base, and the Chinese revolution opened a new page. 2008 is the 80th anniversary of the meeting of Zhu and Mao's Red Army in Jinggangshan. Let us review the short three-year history of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base and unravel a series of historical mysteries left to us in these three years. Regarding when Mao Zedong chose Jinggangshan as a revolutionary base, there are three viewpoints in theoretical circles:

The first view is that on August 7, 1927, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an emergency meeting in Hankou, known as the "August 7th Meeting" in history.Mao Zedong attended the meeting and put forward the important thesis that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun". On August 30, the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to establish the Autumn Harvest Uprising Committee, with Mao Zedong as the Secretary of the Party's Front Enemy Committee and Lu Deming as the commander-in-chief to lead the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan and Jiangxi. On September 9, the riots began. More than 5,000 troops participated in the uprising, known as the First Division of the First Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army.After the attack on Changsha suffered serious setbacks, on September 19, troops from all walks of life gathered in Wenjia City, and Mao Zedong put forward a proposal to go to Jinggangshan, which was adopted.

The second point of view is that on September 19, when various uprising troops gathered in Wenjia City, Hunan Province, Mao Zedong did not propose to go to Jinggangshan. Pingxiang, Jiangxi retreated." On the 24th, the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army was suddenly attacked by the enemy. During the fierce battle, the commander-in-chief Lu Deming unfortunately died. On the 29th, the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army arrived at Sanwan Village, Yongxin County, Jiangxi Province. Mao Zedong held an enlarged meeting of the CCP's Front Enemy Committee at the "Taihexiang" grocery store. There were less than 1,000 people left in the original team of more than 5,000 people.Mao Zedong reduced the troops from one division to one regiment, called the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army. It has two battalions under its jurisdiction and a total of more than 700 guns. : Squads and platoons set up party groups, companies set up party branches, battalions and regiments set up party committees; company and above levels set up party representatives, who are served by the secretary of the party organization at the same level; the entire army is under the unified leadership of the party's front committee.

On October 3, 1927, Mao Zedong led the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants from Sanwan to the ancient town of Ninggang County, Jiangxi Province. On the same day, an enlarged meeting of the former committee was held in the ancient city of Wenchang Palace, that is, the "Ancient City Conference".More than 60 people attended the meeting, including members of the former committee, cadres above the workers' and peasants' revolutionary barracks, party activists, and leaders of the Ninggang County party organization.At the meeting, it was decided to go to Jinggangshan to establish a revolutionary base. After the meeting, Mao Zedong led troops to station in Maoping and Dalong in Jinggangshan.

The third point of view is that the selection of Jinggangshan as a base is a gradual process of practice, while marching and investigating. On October 23, 1927, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army arrived at Jingzhushan via Huang’ao, and then went to Jinggangshan. It was only then that Jinggangshan was selected as the base. I think the third statement is more realistic. On April 12, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek launched a counter-revolutionary coup in Shanghai. In late June, Mao Zedong, secretary of the Central Agricultural Committee, called a meeting of Hunan comrades who had fled to Wuhan at the Wuchang Agricultural Lecture Institute, calling on everyone to "return to their original posts, resume work, take up arms, go up the mountain in the mountains, and board the boat by the lake, and resolutely fight against the Fight the enemy and defend the revolution with arms."Subsequently, Mao Zedong was appointed as the new Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee. On July 15, 1927, the Wuhan "National Government" headed by Wang Jingwei announced the "separation of the Communist Party".After Mao Zedong was ordered to return to Wuhan in early July, entrusted by the Party Central Committee, he drafted the "Outline of the Southern Hunan Movement" at the end of July, and put forward the idea of ​​carrying out armed struggle in southern Hunan with Rucheng as the center, implementing the agrarian revolution, and establishing a revolutionary regime.Rucheng County is in the south of Hunan, bordering Jiangxi and Guangdong.Mao Zedong proposed that the separatist regime should be centered on Rucheng, and the purpose was to establish a separatist regime in Hunan in response to the Nanchang Uprising troops going south to Guangzhou.

After mid-August 1927, the situation changed. Mao Zedong stayed in Changsha and originally planned to launch the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the whole province with Changsha as the center. Later, due to insufficient strength, the scope was reduced.After the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants joined forces in Wenjia City. At that time, they debated whether to continue to fight Changsha. The meeting finally decided that in order to preserve their strength, they should retreat to Pingxiang.After the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants arrived in the ancient city, Long Chaoqing and Long Guoen, leaders of the local party organization in Ninggang County, attended the "ancient city meeting".Later, with their help, the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants won over Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai on Jinggang Mountain, and was able to station in Maoping and Ciping, resettle the wounded and sick, and set up left-behind offices.But at that time, the troops did not go up the mountain immediately, but were divided into two groups: one led by Wan Xixian to Rongling and Anren in eastern Hunan; .The purpose of this trip is to inquire about the news of the Nanchang Uprising troops and consider whether they can gain a foothold in Hunan. Later, after hearing that the remaining troops of the Nanchang Uprising failed in Dongjiang, Guangdong, and Hunan could not gain a foothold, they led their troops through Huang’ao and arrived in Jing’an on October 23. Zhushan, then Jinggangshan.In this regard, Mao Zedong said in "The Struggle at Jinggang Mountains": "We have traveled the entire Luoxiao Mountains. Comparing all parts, the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountains with Ninggang as the center is the most conducive to our military separation."

According to the annotations of the fourth volume of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" (People's Publishing House, September 1960, 1st edition, pages 1137-1138), which is familiar to Chinese people, it is believed that: In the spring of 1928, Mao Zedong stipulated "three disciplines" for the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army in Jinggang Mountains. "; In the summer of 1928, the "Six Points of Attention" was put forward.After 1929, it developed into "Three Disciplines and Eight Points of Attention".I read the relevant information and found that this statement is wrong in time.

The "Three Disciplines" should be promulgated on October 23, 1927, not "the spring of 1928".I analyzed the relevant materials and found that the specific situation should be: Mao Zedong arrived at Jingzhu Mountain on October 23, 1927 after hearing that the rest of the Nanchang Uprising had failed in Dongjiang, Guangdong, and Hunan could not gain a foothold.It was also on this day that Mao Zedong decided to use Jinggangshan as a revolutionary base.In order to enable the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army to establish a good relationship with Wang Zuo's troops after they went up the mountain, and to prevent violations of mass discipline from happening, before the troops set off, Mao Zedong addressed the troops at the "thundering stone" in front of Jingzhushan Village, and proposed for the first time The "Three Great Disciplines" of the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants.

Chen Shiju, a veteran who was present at the time, later recalled in the article "The Origin of the Three Great Disciplines and the Six Points of Attention": "In Jingzhushan, Committee Mao first introduced us to a person in plain clothes who was sent by Wang Zuo. Delegate, welcome us up the mountain. Then, Committee Member Mao briefly introduced the situation in Jinggangshan, and said: Today, we are going up to Jinggangshan and we need to establish a base there. Everyone must establish good relations with the masses on the mountain. Wang Zuo's troops established good relations and did a good job with the masses." "So, he officially announced three disciplines: first, obey orders in action; second, return funds to the public; third, do not take a sweet potato from the common people." It is the "Three Great Disciplines" originally promulgated by the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants.

The time when the "Six Points of Attention" was promulgated should be January 25, 1928, not "summer 1928". According to my analysis, the specific situation should be: the winter in Jinggangshan is extremely cold. area, Mao Zedong decided to attack Suichuan County, which was weakly defended by the enemy. On January 4, 1928, Mao Zedong led two battalions to occupy Suichuan City.The landlords, gentry, and reactionaries in Suichuan spread rumors and slanders against the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, which made the citizens of Suichuan City believe it was true. Under the propaganda and agitation of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, the situation was quickly reversed.However, the troops scattered and moved, and some soldiers borrowed door panels and straw from ordinary people and did not return them voluntarily. Among the many borrowed door panels, they often made mistakes, and the places where they slept were not cleaned.

After Mao Zedong learned about the above situation, on January 25, 1928, in Lijiaping, Suichuan County, he held a meeting of all commanders and fighters of the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, and announced the "Six Points of Attention" of the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, which were: "Lay the door panels; Be sloppy; talk kindly; buy and sell fairly; don’t give up if you invite your master; don’t beat or swear.” Chen Zhengren, then secretary of the Suichuan County Party Committee, later recalled in “Comrade Mao Zedong’s Great Practice of Establishing the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area”: “ In January 1928, I had already heard the six points of attention in Suichuan City... At that time, I also heard the three major disciplines. The chairman emphasized the six points of attention. Every time the troops go to a place, they must strictly check the implementation of the six points of attention situation. Every sentence in the six points of attention is the words of ordinary people, very popular and easy to understand.” On March 28, 1928, Mao Zedong led troops to the Shatian Station in Guidong County, Hunan Province in the south of the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base, and was welcomed by the local people.However, due to negligence, when the local tyrants were attacked, they mistakenly confiscated the dowry of ordinary people as the property of the local tyrants.For this reason, on the morning of April 3, 1928, Mao Zedong concentrated his troops in the fields of the Thirty-Six Dan Hill in Tiger Chong, behind Shatian Wei, Guidong County. The Young Pioneers officially promulgated the "Three Major Disciplines and Six Points of Attention".Li Ziren recorded in the article "The Red Army in Shatian". At that time, Mao Zedong said: "Now we must promulgate several disciplines. The first one is to obey the command; the second one is not to take anything from workers and peasants; the third one is to seize everything. Return to the public. Six things to pay attention to: 1. Put on the door panels; 2. Bale and spread grass; 3. Speak kindly; For the first time, the "Three Major Disciplines and Six Points of Attention" of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army were promulgated systematically and completely.This time he also changed the original "don't take a sweet potato from the common people" to "don't take anything from the workers and peasants". In 1929, after the Red Army marched to southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, it passed through the Jiangxi-Guangdong border area.Because these places were relatively closed, after the Red Army arrived, they still defecated in the wild and bathed in ditches and rivers according to their past habits, which aroused strong dissatisfaction among the local people.After Mao Zedong knew about it, he immediately changed the original "six points of attention" to "eight points of attention", and added two new ones: "avoid women when taking a bath and find a toilet after defecating". Later, he felt that it was not elegant enough, so he changed it to "clean the yard clean , dig sanitary pits (toilets)." On September 25, 1930, the "Red Army Soldiers Association Constitution" issued by the General Political Department of the Red Army officially included "three major disciplines and eight points of attention".In addition to the original six items, two additional items were added: "Do not swallow shit casually and do not search the pockets of enemy soldiers". In October 1947, the headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army promulgated the "Three Major Disciplines and Eight Points of Attention". 1: The Jinggangshan army meeting in April 1928 was an extremely important historical event in the history of the development of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. However, there are three theories about the time of the army meeting: early April; mid-April; and April 28. The theory of "early April" was proposed by Zhang Guoqi in the fourth issue of "Party History Research" in 1981, "Research on the Time of Meeting Teachers in Jinggangshan". This statement has long been denied by historians because it does not match historical documents. The theory of "mid-April" was put forward by Chen Huocheng in the article "Jinggangshan may be in mid-April" in the sixth issue of "Party History Research" in 1981. The basis is: April 25, 1928, "Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee "Letter from the Central Committee" contains the words "According to the report from Ji'an, Mao Zedong did meet with Zhu De's department". On May 2, 1928, when the Fourth Red Army was established and occupied Yongxin City for the first time, Mao Zedong wrote a report to the Central Committee, saying: "In pursuit of Yang Ruxuan's division of the Maoists, they were driven to Jiangxi by the Maoists instead." Bian. The 81st Regiment was defeated at Wudoujiang in Suichuan, the 79th Regiment was disarmed by Mao, and the 3rd Battalion was also defeated at Yongxin by Zhubu." Some people think that: from the establishment of the Fourth Army, through the battle of the yellow spider , Wudoujiang battle, to occupy Yongxin, it takes about half a month. Therefore, it is concluded that the time for joining forces should be in mid-April. The theory of "April 28" is based on the memories of many old Red Army soldiers. In 1962, Marshal Zhu De said in the article "From Nanchang Uprising to Jinggangshan": "On April 28, 1928, the part of our troops preserved from the Nanchang Uprising and the Hunan local armed forces met Chairman Mao directly in Long City, Ninggang County. The Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants led by the leaders joined forces in victory." In addition, He Changgong, Xiao Ke, Long Kaifu, Tang Tianji, Lai Yi and other veteran comrades all recalled "April 28", among which He Changgong said it very affirmatively. To sum up, I think "April 28" is more authentic and credible, because it is the dictation of the person involved, and not just one person. 2: There are two theories about the name of the troops after the Jinggangshan reunion: the first one is that after Zhu and Mao joined forces, the "Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" was established; In the 11th issue, the author believes that the division was originally named the "Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army", and was later renamed the "Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army." After consulting the information, I think Han Taihua's statement is more correct.Because, on May 2, 1928, Mao Zedong wrote a letter to the Central Committee in the name of "Secretary of the Military Commission of the Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army".On May 13 of the same year, the report of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Party Central Committee on the current military situation also called the Jinggangshan Army the "Fourth Army of the Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants." On May 25, 1928, the "Central Announcement No. 51-Military Work Outline" issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed: "The army in the separatist area can be officially named the Red Army to cancel the previous workers' and peasants' revolution (military work plan). ).” On June 4 of the same year, the Party Central Committee sent a letter to Zhu and Mao and forwarded it to the Front Enemy Committee, saying: “As for your army, you can officially change its name to the Red Army.” After that, the army was officially called the “Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army No. Four Armies". 3: Regarding the formation sequence of the divisions, there are three divisions and regiments under the "Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army". The brigade said"; "The three divisions and six regiments said". The theory of "two divisions, six regiments and one teaching brigade" is based on: On May 2, 1928, Mao Zedong wrote in Yongxin's letter to the Central Committee: "The former Hunan Special Committee decided that the two divisions of Zhu and Mao would be combined into the Fourth Army. Appointed Zhu as the commander of the army and Mao as the party representative. Zhu's division was organized into the tenth division, and Mao's division into the eleventh division. The peasant army in the counties in southern Hunan was organized into the two divisions. Zhu was also the commander of the tenth division, and Wan Xi was the party representative first; Mao was also the commander of the 11th Division (originally Zhang Ziqing, because he was injured and Mao was on behalf of him), and He Tingying was the party representative. The other teaching brigade, Chen Yi was the captain." In July 1928, Du Xiu, secretary of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, said The report of the Hunan provincial party committee stated that there were six regiments. "Two divisions, six regiments and one teaching brigade" refers to the tenth division, eleventh division and teaching brigade under the jurisdiction of the Fourth Army, the twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, and thirty regiments under the tenth division, and the eleventh division. The division governs the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd regiments, and Chen Yi is the captain of the teaching brigade. The main basis for the theory of "Three Divisions and Nine Regiments" is: On May 13, 1928, the "Report of the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee" stated: "According to the instructor of the first company who was captured and released in Yiji'an, the Workers' and Peasants Revolutionary Army's first The Fourth Army (that is, Zhu Mao's troops) has more than 4,500 guns, a total of 10, 11, and 12 divisions. The army commander Zhu De, the party representative Mao Zedong (the first generation of Wan Xi), and the secretary of the Military Commission Wan Xixian. The tenth division commander Zhu Jian, for The remainder of the 25th Division was compiled by the elite of the entire army; Mao Jian, the commander of the 11th Division, was compiled by the Jiangxi Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army; Chen Yi, the commander of the 12th Division, was formed by the peasant army in the Ping, Li and Lei areas." The article mentions 3 divisions, but did not mention how many regiments there were. On August 1, 1933, He Changgong said in the article "The Jinggangshan Struggle and the Creation of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" published in "Red China": "By the end of March 1928 (quote's note-it should be the lunar calendar) Comrade Zhu De The legacy of leading the "August 1st" and the southern Hunan riots was brought to Jinggang, joined with the Maoists, and was officially reorganized into the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in Long City, Ninggang. Zhu De was the commander of the 10th Division and the representative of the Maoist Party and the 11th Division. The division commander, Wang Erzhuo was the chief of staff, and Chen Yi was the commander of the 12th division. A total of nine regiments were organized....Wang Erzhuo, the commander of the 28th regiment, He Changgong, the party representative, Hu Shaohai, the head of the 29th regiment, and Gong Chu, the party representative , Zhang Ziqing, head of the 31st Regiment, He Tingying, party representative, Yuan Wencai, head of the 32nd Regiment, Chen Dongri, party representative, Dai Chengcheng, head of the 33rd Regiment, Huang Kecheng, party representative, Li Qizhong, head of the 34th Regiment, On behalf of Huang Yizao, the 35th and 36th regiments are unknown. The special battalion commander Song Qiaosheng." He Changgong was one of the important figures in the Jinggangshan revolutionary base period, and he made it clear that it was the "three divisions and nine regiments" at that time.In addition, the old Red Army Huang Kecheng, Xiao Ke, Li Qizhong, Li Keru, Zhu Liangcai, etc. all recalled that there were 3 divisions and 9 regiments, and clearly pointed out that there were 34, 35, and 36 regiments. The head of the 34th Regiment was Kuang Lang and the party representative Deng Zonghai; the head of the 35th Regiment Huang Kecheng and the party representative Li Yiding; the head of the 36th Regiment Li Qizhong and the party representative Huang Yizao. The main basis for the theory of "Three Divisions and Six Regiments" is: On September 1, 1928, Chen Yi's "Report on the History and Conditions of the Zhu Mao Army" stated: "By April, there were more than 2,000 people in the Zhu Division, and more than 8,000 people in the Hunan Agricultural Army. There were more than a thousand people in Mao's department, and Yuan and Wang each had 300 people. Such a large army needed unified command and training, so it was decided to establish the Fourth Army of the Red Army, with Zhu as the commander and Mao as the party representative. Insufficient firearms were reorganized into six regiments of 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33. The division headquarters were cancelled, and the army directly commanded more than 10,000 troops, with only 2,000 guns. .” Why are there three inconsistent records?This is mainly because there have been two changes in the establishment from the time the divisions joined forces on April 28 to the end of May: Before May 2, Mao Zedong decided at a meeting of cadres above the company level that the Fourth Army would have the Tenth Division, the Eleventh Division, and the Teaching Division. The brigade, the two divisions have 6 regiments under their jurisdiction. On May 4th, during the meeting of the divisions, another 12th Division was established. The reason was that it was difficult to organize the agricultural armies of the counties in southern Hunan into the 10th and 11th Divisions, so a supplementary agricultural division was built, that is, the 12th Division. Division, the 12th division commander is concurrently held by Chen Yi. Regarding the sixteen-character tactics of the Red Army’s guerrilla tactics: “When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationed, we harass; It was specifically summarized by Zhu De; the second is the experience of collective creation; the third is formed and proposed by Mao Zedong in combat practice. One is Zhu De's specific summary. In April 1928, Zhu De led his troops to Jinggangshan, just in time for the enemy troops from Jiangxi to "advance and suppress". In May, Zhu De successively won victories in the battles of Wudoujiang, Gaolong, Caoshi, and Longyuankou.In these battles, some of Zhu De used assault warfare, and some used ambush warfare. In fact, it was the tactics of "the enemy advances and retreats, the enemy camps and we harass, the enemy is tired and we fight, and the enemy retreats and we chase". In 1944, Zhu De said in his "Speech at the Symposium on Compiling the History of the First Red Army": "In the past, starting from the 1911 Revolution in 1911, we fought against the Beiyang warlords in Sichuan and Yunnan for ten years, and we always won with few. Many. The main experience in the military is to adopt the tactics of guerrilla warfare. I remember that when I was studying military affairs in Moscow, the instructors tested me and asked me how to fight after returning to China. "If you don't win, go away" and "drag the team up the mountain when necessary", they were criticized at the time. In fact, this is the idea of ​​guerrilla warfare. So, on this point, I played a leading role." In "Westward Journey" In the book, Zhu De once said, "The tactic I used to attack the enemy and win a great victory is the mobile guerrilla tactic, which I got from my experience in fighting barbarians and bandits when I was stationed on the Sino-French border. "In Liu Baiyu's "Biography of General Zhu De" when it comes to the sixteen-character tactic, he said: "Comrade Zhu De is the inventor and executor of this." American female writer Agnes Smedley said in "The Great Road" : "Zhu De summed up military tactics into the following points: (1) the enemy advances and we retreat; (2) the enemy camps and we harass; (3) the enemy is tired and we attack; (4) the enemy retreats and we pursue." Gong Chu, a representative of the Youth League Party, recalled that when Mao Zedong made a strategic report at a meeting, he said that Zhu De proposed guerrilla tactics as follows: 1. The enemy advances and we retreat:...preserve strength and wait to shift the offensive.2. The enemy retreats and we advance: ...hit their morale, and accumulate small victories into big victories.3. The enemy stationed in us to harass us: ...to exhaust the enemy and create a favorable situation for us.3. When the enemy is tired, we will fight: ...we should concentrate our forces and take the initiative to attack in order to annihilate the enemy. Second, it is an experience created collectively.Because the sixteen-character tactic "When the enemy advances, we retreat, when the enemy is stationed, we harass, when the enemy is tired, we fight, and when the enemy retreats, we pursue" not only in the Jinggangshan revolutionary base, but also in other revolutionary bases. For example, in the western Hunan and Hubei revolutionary bases at that time In the Honghu area of ​​Honghu, in the guerrilla activities, the guerrilla tactics of "you come and I fly, you go and I return, if there are too many people, run, and if there are few people, fight".In the revolutionary base areas of Hubei, Henan and Anhui, in guerrilla warfare, "concentrate operations and disperse guerrillas"; "when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy retreats, we advance"; Third, it was formed and proposed by Mao Zedong in combat practice.After Mao Zedong led the autumn harvest uprising troops from Hunan and Jiangxi borders to Jinggangshan, he reformed Zhu Kongyang (Zhu Deafzi), the leader of the green forest on Jinggangshan, to deal with the official army's "circle tactics" method. In January 1928, Mao Zedong led his troops to conquer Suichuan County, and held a joint meeting of the Suichuan and Wan'an county committees in Suichuan County. At the meeting, Mao Zedong proposed that "when the enemy advances, we retreat; "Chasing" "Twelve Characters".Chen Zhengren, secretary of the Suichuan County Party Committee, later recalled in the article "Comrade Mao Zedong's Great Practice of Establishing the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area": ​​"When I was in Suichuan (that is, in January 1928), I heard Chairman Mao's proposal for guerrilla warfare in the 16th century. The principle of one word, especially in the first half of this year, is more specific." Xu Daquan, a member of the Wan'an County Party Committee and Secretary-General of the County Soviet Union who attended the meeting, also recalled: "In the first month of the ancient calendar in 1928, Chairman Mao A joint meeting of peasant riots in southwestern Jiangxi was held in Sui, attended by Zhang Shixi, Liu Xinghan, Guo Dingyuan and others. After the meeting, a meeting was held in Shawoli in Luotang (the name is forgotten), and Chairman Mao’s instructions in Suichuan were discussed: 1. Twelve-character secret formula..." Zeng Huaying, a member of the Wan'an County Party Committee who participated in the meeting, also recalled: "Chairman Mao taught us how to deal with the enemy at the Suichuan joint meeting. If we win, we will fight, if we cannot win, we will leave, if the enemy comes, we will retreat, if the enemy retreats, we will chase after him.” Zhu and Mao joined forces in Jinggangshan, and through the practice of guerrilla warfare, the "Twelve-Character Jue" was developed into the "Sixteen-Character Jue". On April 5, 1929, Mao Zedong drafted the "Letter from the Former Committee to the Central Committee" in Ruijin. In the letter, he said: "The tactics we have learned from the struggle in the past three years are really different from the tactics of ancient and modern China and foreign countries. With our tactics, The mobilization of mass struggles is becoming more and more widespread day by day, and any powerful enemy cannot do anything to us. Our tactics are guerrilla tactics. Generally speaking, it is: 'Divide the troops to mobilize the masses, concentrate to deal with the enemy', 'The enemy advances We retreat, the enemy stays and we harass, the enemy is tired and we attack, the enemy retreats and we pursue', 'Separate rule in a fixed area, use a wave-like advance policy, strong enemy tracking, use a circling policy', 'A very short time , a very good way to mobilize a large crowd'. This tactic is like playing a net. It must be opened at any time, and it must be retracted at any time. It is opened to attract the masses, and it is retracted to deal with the enemy. This tactic has been used for three years. It is the first time that this letter has completely recorded the "Sixteen-Character Jue", and it is also the first time that the "Sixteen-Character Jue" has appeared in historical documents. In December 1930, the Red Army held a mobilization meeting in Xiaobu. Before the meeting, Mao Zedong wrote a couplet in his own handwriting: "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationed, we harass; when the enemy is tired, we fight; when the enemy retreats, we pursue In guerrilla warfare, the chances of victory are determined; stride forward and retreat, lure the enemy to go deep, concentrate forces, defeat each one, and wipe out the enemy in mobile warfare." Which of the above three statements is the most reasonable?The ones with the most right to speak should be the most important leaders of the party and the Red Army who participated in the Jinggangshan struggle, especially Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Peng Dehuai. They all believed that the "Sixteen-Character Jue" was summarized by Mao Zedong. In June 1962, Zhu De said in the article "From Nanchang Uprising to Jinggangshan": "As for guerrilla tactics and even the entire strategic issue, Chairman Mao solved it systematically and perfectly later." In 1937, Peng Dehuai wrote in "How the Eighth Route Army Fights" One article said: "Comrade Mao Zedong once invented a famous sixteen-character guerrilla tactical principle, that is, 'When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationed, we harass; when the enemy is tired, we attack; The article "On Guerrilla Warfare" stated that the tactical characteristics of the Red Army's guerrilla warfare "are included in Mao Zedong's sixteen-character tactic of 'When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationed, we harass; when the enemy is tired, we fight; Within Huang Gonglue's two tactical slogans of 'turning parts into wholes, turning the whole into parts'".There are also old comrades such as Xiao Ke and He Changgong who participated in the struggle in Jinggangshan. They also think in their memories that the "Sixteen-Character Jue" was proposed and summarized by Mao Zedong during the Jinggangshan period. The story of Zhu De picking grain with cadres and soldiers in Jinggangshan was widely recited in the revolutionary base area as early as the late 1920s. After 1949, Zhu Liangcai, the correspondent of Commander Zhu De, published an article titled "Zhu De's Pole" in "Singhuo Liaoyuan", and this story has since spread throughout the world.Later, according to Zhu Liangcai's article, it was also adapted into short essays and included in the "Chinese" textbook for primary schools.The Chinese Revolutionary Museum also exhibits revolutionary cultural relics copied from this article.Fan Shude, the head of the Red Army’s military supply department, saw the article "Zhu De's Pole" published by Zhu Liangcai. As an experiencer and witness of this story, he wrote an article in the third and fourth issues of "Literature and History Bulletin" in 1982. Zhu Liangcai's reminiscence article, as well as the textbook compiled based on this article and the revolutionary cultural relics exhibited in the Chinese Revolutionary Museum, have many discrepancies with the facts. Let us first look at the specifics of this story: the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base is located at the junction of four counties including Ninggang, Suichuan, and Yongxin, with a radius of 550 miles. Very few, only enough for the masses to use for themselves. The troops had to go down the mountain to pick up food and store grain, so in October 1928, a movement to pick up grain up the mountain was launched.At that time, the headquarters of the Fourth Red Army and its directly affiliated agencies and troops were stationed in Taoliao Village, Ninggang County. After hearing the news, the cadres and soldiers rushed to sign up.Commander Zhu De, who is over 40 years old, also excitedly proposed to pick the grain himself.Considering that he was busy with work, everyone advised him not to go, but he said: "I am in good health, and I can arrange time to deal with military work sooner or later, so I have to go to pick food." Due to everyone's active participation, there was a shortage of transport tools.Zhu De asked Fan Shude, the director of military supplies, to make him a shoulder pole. Fan Shude later recalled: "I immediately took an orderly to find a proprietress named Zhang near the Zhang Family Temple in Taoliao Village (at that time, the Red Army called the local middle-aged women. ), bought a moso bamboo from her with a copper plate, cut it into two poles, gave one to Comrade Zhu De, and kept the other for my own use. On Comrade Zhu De’s one, I wrote on one end with a brush " Zhu De's shoulder pole', with the words 'No Mishandling' written on the other end. Zhu De smiled and said: 'Okay, I will use it tomorrow.'” The next day, Zhu De personally picked the food, which greatly encouraged the commanders and fighters.The route for picking food was from Taoliao Village, where the military headquarters was stationed, to Bailu Village, east of Ninggang County at the foot of the mountain. about a catty.Commander Zhu De is getting older, so he should pick less, but when he was carrying food, one end of the burden was three white cloth rice bags that he carried when he was marching, and the other end was a thick cloth sewn by a northerner called "carrying a yard". ''s rice bag, with a total of 40 catties at both ends, plus a German-made No. 3 shell gun that he often wears and a leather bullet bag with about a hundred rounds of bullets, the total is about 46 to 7 catties."Some veterans even compiled an allegro: "Mr. Zhu carried food across Huangyang, and Commissar Mao worked day and night in Ciping. The whole army is united and revolutionized. Victory is sure to be sure." Fan Shude pointed out that Zhu Liangcai's recollection has three inconsistencies with historical facts: 1: The words on Zhu De's shoulder pole do not match the facts. It is not the words "Zhu De's shoulder pole" and "Zhu De's record", but one end of the pole reads "Zhu De's shoulder pole ’, and the other end reads ‘No Mishandling’, a total of eight characters; 2: Zhu De’s route of picking food does not match the actual facts. Zhu Liangcai said that he went from various villages on Jinggang Mountain to Maoping, but in fact, it was from Bailu Village to Taoliao Village; 3: The weight of the grain was not consistent with the facts. Zhu Liangcai said that he had picked a "full load of rice" (a load of rice was usually one hundred catties at the time), but in fact, it was about forty catties (at that time Fan Shude is in his 20s and only weighed about 30 catties). On June 4, 2001, the "Liberation Army Daily" published the article "I often think of the days of hiding Zhu De's shoulder pole" dictated by Zhu Liangcai, correcting some mistakes in his past memories. "A article. The article said that the comrades in arms were afraid that Zhu De would be exhausted from carrying food down the mountain, so they hid his pole. I was the one who hid Zhu De's pole. At that time, Commander Zhu often studied the enemy's situation with Chairman Mao at night. During the day, I went down the mountain with the soldiers to pick up food. I was his correspondent. I was worried that he would be exhausted, so I tried to dissuade him with other comrades in arms, but no one could persuade him. Later, I came up with a "ghost idea" and simply used Commander-in-Chief Zhu But he still didn't give up. He found Fan Shude, the director of military supplies, and asked him to buy a moso bamboo for a copper coin, and made a pole for himself. He also specially wrote "Zhu De's pole, don't take it randomly 'Eight words, and happily went down the mountain to pick up food." Doubting whether Lin Biao is the representative figure of "how long the red flag can be fought", there are two opinions in the historian circle: one says no; the other says yes. Those who say this is not the case believe that Lin Biao had a right-leaning pessimism about the future of the revolution when he was in Jinggangshan, but he was not a representative who doubted "how long the red flag can be fought".The reason is very simple: Mao Zedong said in his two articles "A Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" and "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War". As early as the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928, some comrades in Jinggangshan had proposed "How long can the red flag last?"Lin Biao was not in Jinggangshan at all at that time, and the article was obviously not aimed at Lin Biao, because Lin Biao went to Jinggangshan with Zhu De and Chen Yi on April 28, 1928. Those who say this kind of opinion believe that the question of "how long the red flag can be fought" was indeed not related to Lin Biao when Mao Zedong pointed out for the first time, but Mao Zedong pointed out this trend of thought not once but five times.The first time was in the winter of 1927. Mao Zedong led more than 5,000 people from the Autumn Harvest Uprising to Jinggangshan. Many people were pessimistic about the revolution. They asked, "How long can the red flag last?"During the march, many people fled and mutinied. Among them were soldiers, company platoon leaders, regimental commanders, and division commanders. The revolutionary army left Jinggangshan and went to southern Hunan to carry out the New Year's Day riots. In the end, the New Year's Day riots and the Jinggangshan revolutionary base suffered defeat at the same time. At this time, many people lacked confidence in the revolution and asked, "How long can the red flag last?"The third time was in August 1928. Due to the wrong guidance of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, the 28th and 29th regiments of the Red Army rushed into southern Hunan. The enemy took the opportunity to attack Jinggangshan, which led to the failure of Jinggangshan in August. Many people again mentioned "how long can the red flag last"?The fourth time was in the winter of 1928. The enemy army from Hunan and Jiangxi mobilized heavy troops to besiege Jinggang Mountain. The food on Jinggang Mountain was difficult. "This pessimistic argument.The fifth time was in the spring of 1929, when the enemy troops from Hunan and Jiangxi "suppressed" Jinggangshan for the third time. Some people raised the pessimistic argument of "how long can the red flag last". From the above analysis, it can be seen that the first and second times had nothing to do with Lin Biao, but the last three times may have something to do with Lin Biao.Lin Biao was only 21 years old at the time, so it was reasonable to be pessimistic about the revolution. On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao fled by plane. After the plane exploded in the People’s Republic of Mongolia, some books suddenly said that Lin Biao often said in the Jinggangshan period, “One Jinggangshan, ten Jinggangshan is also empty.” Can it conquer the world?" For this reason, Mao Zedong specially wrote to Lin Biao, "Why Can the Red Regime Exist in China?" "A letter refers to something.In addition, after Lin Biao fell to his death for treason and defection to the enemy, Chen Yi, Xiao Ke, Zeng Shan and others pointed out when exposing and criticizing Lin Biao, "As early as the period of the Agrarian Revolution, Lin Biao was pessimistic and disappointed about the future of the Chinese revolution."Based on these circumstances, it can be analyzed that although the phrase "how long can the red flag last" was not originally spoken by Lin Biao, Lin Biao may be a representative of it. The triumphant meeting of the Fifth Red Army and the Fourth Red Army was a major event in the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base. However, there are three different versions of the time and place of the meeting between the Fifth Red Army and the Fourth Red Army in historical documents and memory materials, and there are still different opinions. , at a loss. One: At the beginning of November 1928, we joined forces in Ningkang.依据是，1929年9月1日，陈毅在《关于朱毛军的历史及其状况的报告》中说：“彭德怀部红军第五军于11月初由平江游击宁冈附近与四军会合”。彭德怀在《往事回忆》说：“我和代远同志带五个大队，遵照湖南省委指示，在11月初同红四军在宁冈会师了。” 二：1928年12月1日，在井冈山会师。1929年2月25日，中共湖南省委派往湘赣边界巡视的杨克敏在《关于湘赣边苏区情况的综合报告》说：“在平铜修的第五军大部于1928年12月1号到达井冈，人数约一千上下，分五个大队，由彭德怀同志统率，兵士多系平江农民，作战颇勇敢。” 三：1928年12月10日，在宁冈会师。1929年1月12日，红五军党代表滕代远《给湖南省委的报告》中说：“12月10日，到宁冈与前委CP、CY特委，四、五军军委开了一个联席会议。” 翻阅彭德怀1970年写的《彭德怀自述》一书，彭德怀是这样说的：“到达该地是广暴纪念前几日。”（《彭德怀自述》解放军文艺出版社2002年1月第1版，第116页）广暴也就是广州起义（又称广州暴动），时间是1928年12月11日，所以会师时间不会是11月初，为何彭德怀在《往事回忆》说“我和代远同志带五个大队，遵照湖南省委指示，在11月初同红四军在宁冈会师了”呢？我认为彭德怀在这里使用的是农历的日子。会师的具体地点应该是宁冈的新城，因为李聚奎、李寿轩、李克如、何长工、黄克诚等许许多多的老同志在回忆此事时都认为是在宁冈新城会师的。谢良玉、谢宣福、谢毅珠、谢开炎等当地许多老同志回忆红五军与红四军会师时，也都认为是在宁冈新城会师的。 由此可以推断，红四军与红五军是1928年12月10日在宁冈的新城会师的。 1930年2月24日，王佐、袁文才在永新县城被红军枪杀，死时都只有32岁。 关于王佐、袁文才被谁杀死的问题，过去史学界有三种意见：第一种意见认为，当时毛泽东、朱德面对国民党军队的“围剿”，采取“围魏救赵”的策略，率领红四军离开了井冈山。彭德怀率领的红五军留守井冈山，杀害袁文才的是彭德怀，而且在事发后第3天，也就是2月27日，长沙《大公报》发出一则信息：“彭德怀枪毙袁、王两匪”，后来，普遍认为是彭德怀杀死了他们。林彪、四人帮曾将此作为彭德怀的一大罪状；第二种意见认为，杀害袁文才、王佐的是中央派去解决袁、王问题的彭清泉和中共赣西南特委（又被称为边界特委）书记朱昌偕；第三种意见认为，是由中央巡视员彭清泉和中共赣西南特委书记朱昌偕策划，彭德怀“轻听轻信”，没有冷静思考，当然主要应该由中央巡视员彭清泉和中共赣西南特委书记朱昌偕负责。 1928年6月18日至7月11日，中共“六大”在莫斯科召开，会议通过了《苏维埃政权的组织问题决议案》，其中“（十）对土匪的关系”这一部分明确规定“暴动前可以同他们联盟，暴动后则应解除其武装并消灭其领袖。与土匪或类似的团体联盟，仅在暴动前可以适用。暴动之后，宜解除其武装并严厉地镇压他们。这是保持地方秩序和免遭革命死灰复燃之必要的先决的前提。他们的首领应当作反革命的首领看待，即令他们帮助暴动亦应如此。这类首领均应完全歼除。土匪若浸入革命军队或政府中，便危险异常。这些分子必须从革命军队和政府机关中驱逐出去，即其最可靠的一部分，亦只能利用他们在敌人后方工作，绝不能置他们于苏维埃政府范围之内”。（中央档案馆：《中共中央文件选集》（1928），中共中央党史出版社1989年8月第1版，第399－400页）而王佐、袁文才二人在加入中国共产党之前就是井冈山地区的两大土匪组织头目。 最主要的原因还是井冈山当地土客籍矛盾所致。客籍，也就是客家人，王佐、袁文才的祖辈都是为了躲避北方的战乱，背井离乡从北方迁移到此地的。因为当地的“土著人”占据着适合农耕的平坦地区，所以客家人只能居住在土著人不愿意居住的山区，而且还要受到当地土籍豪绅地主的压迫和剥削。对此，毛泽东在《井冈山的斗争》一文中讲得十分清楚：“客籍占领山地，为占领平地的土籍所压迫，素无政治权利。前年和去年的国民革命，客籍表示欢迎，以为出头有日。不料革命失败，客家被土籍压迫如故。我们的区域内，宁冈、遂川、酃县、茶陵，都有土客籍问题，而以宁冈的问题最为严重。前年至去年，宁冈的土籍革命派和客籍结合，在共产党的领导下，推翻了土籍豪绅的政权，掌握了全县。去年六月，江西朱培德政府反革命，九月，豪绅带领朱培德军队'进剿'宁冈，重新挑起土客籍人民之间的斗争。” 1929年，土客籍之间的矛盾已到了非常尖锐地步，1929年1月，毛泽东率领红四军主力下井冈山，前委随之而去，边界特委成了井冈山革命根据地最高的行政机关。宛希先是惟一的外籍干部，时年24岁，是追随毛泽东上的井冈山，他原本为土、客籍双方都能接受的人物，尤其与袁文才、王佐过从甚密。自朱、毛率红四军离开井冈山后，他更成了袁、王在边界特委内惟一的依靠。不久，宛希先就被特委以逃跑罪名处死。1929年5月，重新选举的特委里，邓乾元、朱昌偕先后任书记，副书记、常委、执行委员几乎都是土籍人士。当时，在宁冈有“土籍的党，客籍的枪”之称，这形象地说明了特委与袁文才、王佐之间的现状。客籍的袁文才、王佐与土籍的王怀、朱昌偕、刘珍、龙超清、邓乾元等之间已出现互不买帐的现象。袁文才、王佐不大听从特委的领导，特委则认为袁、王闹独立，想占山为王当土匪，所以视他们为潜在的敌人。1929年5月至8月，湘赣边特委负责人邓乾元在《湘赣边界工作报告》则竟然把袁、王当成不可救药的“匪首”，报告中说：“危害边界的第一个势力就是土匪，本来边界的政权并不是真正的共产党所领导的政权，而是与土匪合作的联合政权。现在土匪问题更加严重，袁、王现在对我们处处怀疑，袁有另找出路脱离我们的象征，王在袁的影响下，亦与我们关系日趋恶化，过去对土匪的缓冲政策已是不能再用了。”可见，邓乾元不仅把袁、王当成敌人，甚至对边界政权也予以否定。 在土籍王怀、朱昌偕、刘珍、龙超清、邓乾元等人苦苦寻找机会对付袁文才、王佐时，机会终于来了。1930年初，王佐、袁文才活捉了茶陵靖卫团团长罗克绍，还俘获了20多个造枪工人和部分造枪机器。在没有请示特委的情况下，他们自作主张，劝降罗克绍，计划用他们办一个兵工厂，但特委认定是袁、王与敌勾结，这件事也就成为杀害袁文才、王佐的导火线。 恰在这时，中央巡视员彭清泉悄然来到了边界，他带着中共“六大”对土匪处置的教条，准备以非常手段解决王、袁问题，这一想法与边界特委的想法不谋而合。但是袁、王掌控的红四军三十二团，拥有1000余兵员，700余支枪，还有一座兵工厂，他们又无力对付。于是，他们就打算将袁、王二人诱骗至永新县城，然后借助正游弋在安福、永新边界的彭德怀的红五军，再行下手。他们知道袁文才、王佐最听毛泽东的话，他们就盗用毛泽东的名义，给王佐、袁文才修书一封，约王佐、袁文才率部于2月22日在永新县城合编，然后配合红五军共同攻打吉安。他们还派出特委负责人朱昌偕、王怀等人，前往彭德怀红五军军部，对彭德怀说“袁文才、王佐要叛变”“在永新县城联席会议上，强迫特委决定把边区地方武装归他们改编统率”等等。最后，彭德怀信以为真，就答应派张纯清率红五军第四纵队300余人随朱昌偕赶往永新县城，同时，特委又将宁冈、茶陵、遂川等五县赤卫队调往永新县城。 就这样，王佐、袁文才被害。可见，上述第三种意见，即彭德怀偏听偏信朱昌偕、王怀等人之言，错杀了王、袁较为可靠。